In this paper, we study the robustness of state-of-theart automaticfingerprint verification systems against hillclimbing and brute-force attacks. We compare the performance ofthis type ofattacks against two diferent minutiaebased systems, the NIST Fingerprint Image Software 2 (NFIS2) reference system and a Match-on-Card based system. In order to study their success rate, the attacks are analyzed and modified in each scenario. We focus on the influence of initial conditions in hill-climbing attacks, like the number ofminutiae in the synthetically generated templates or theperformance ofeach type ofmodification in the template. We demonstrate how slight modifications in the hill-climbing algorithm lead to very different success rates.
Introduction
Biometrics is becoming an important issue in our society [1] . The heightened interest in biometrics-based automated personal identification has resulted in the development of several commercial biometric recognition systems. Fingerprints are one of the most commonly used biometrics due to their reduced size and acceptability [2] . Despite the development of fingerprint recognition techniques, there are many security concerns [3] which still make it a topic for discussion.
One of the hot topics within biometrics are Match-onDevices, and in particular Match-on-Card based systems for fingerprint recognition. Smart-cards allow to encrypt and protect stored information and to execute matching algorithms [4] . Thus, the user's fingerprint template and the matching algorithm can be stored in a smart-card without compromising its security. Corroborating this increasing interest in Match-on-Card systems, in the Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC) 2004 [5] , a special evaluation track for matching systems with reduced time and memory restrictions was introduced. Furthermore, in this year's competition, FVC 2006 [6] , a new category including Match-on-Card systems has been proposed.
1-4244-0174-7/06/$20.00 ©2006 IEEE
151
A fingerprint recognition system is vulnerable to attacks which may decrease its security level. Ratha et al [7] have studied and classified these attacks in 8 different types. Attacks from type 1 are aimed at the sensor and can be carried out using fake fingerprints. Types 3, 5 and 6 may be performed as Trojan Horse attacks, bypassing the feature extractor, the matcher, and the system database respectively. Types 2, 4, 7 and 8 attack communication channels and can either try to intercept information or insert it into the channel. Possible attack points in a general biometric recognition system are depicted in Fig. 1 .
In this study, we focus on attacks known as hill-climbing attacks [8] . Hill-climbing attacks consist of an application that sends synthetically generated minutiae templates to the matcher and, according to the match score, randomly modifies the templates until the decision threshold is exceeded. We implement hill-climbing attacks against both the NFIS2 reference system [9] and a Match-on-Card (MoC) system, and then study some factors involved in the success rate of the attack. A direct comparison is also made between our hill-climbing attacks and brute-force attacks.
Using smart-card embedded matching systems for fingerprint recognition has already been studied [4, 10] but, to the best of our knowledge, no attacks aimed directly to the smart-card matcher have been reported in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Hillclimbing and brute force attacks are explained in Sect. 2, the fingerprint recognition systems under attack are presented in Sect. 3, experiments are described in Sect. 4, and conclusions are finally drawn in Sect. 5.
Hill-climbing and Brute-Force Attacks
Hill-climbing attacks against automated fingerprint recognition systems have been studied by Uludag and Jain [8] and Soutar [12] . A hill-climbing attack may be performed by an application that sends random templates to the system, which are perturbed iteratively. The application reads the output match score and continues with the perturbed template only when the matching score increases until the decision threshold is exceeded.
A hill-climbing attack may be of type 2 or 4, depending on the point of attack. Soutar proposed in [12] 2 attack with a face recognition system. The input image is conveniently modified until a desired matching score is attained. In [8] , a type 4 attack against a minutiae-based fingerprint recognition system is described. Uludag and Jain [8] propose an attack based on synthetic random minutiae templates which are modified, one minutia at a time, until the decision threshold is exceeded.
In this paper, we study a hill-climbing attack based on the one presented by Uludag and Jain [8] . The bining its entries into clusters, and then combines the clusters, building graphs. The larger the graph, the larger the match score will be. In our system, the match score is not normalized.
Match-on-Card (MoC) System
The Match-on-Card (MoC) system under consideration is a proprietary prototype. The matcher is fully embedded in a smart-card and may only be accessed via a smart-card reader connected to a PC.
One of the main differences between this system and the 152 mosommo Figure 3 . Top: Digital Persona fingerprint sensor used for acquiring the fingerprints used in ourexperiment [11] . Bottom: Smart-card and smart-card reader used in our experiments.
reference system explained in Sect. 3.1 is that a MoC system is hardware limited. A smart-card has a very limited processing capacity and the matching algorithm should be efficient enough to perform the match in a reasonably short time. There has been much work in this field resulting in many algorithm proposals which try to reduce the matching computational cost [4, 10, 13] . The MoC system used in our experiments is shown in Fig. 3 . The smart-card reader is attached to a PC via USB, so the attacks can be performed from the PC. The user's fingerprint template is also stored in the smart-card memory. We only know the template storing format, which is also minutiae-based. In our experiments, we use the NFIS2 MINTDCT module (see Sect. 3.1) for the minutiae extraction phase and then perform the required transformations to the output file to make it compatible with this system. Note that the minutiae extraction phase would never be carried out by the smart-card, it must be done by an external application. The matcher retums the score as an integer value in a range from 0 to 100, 100 being the maximum likelihood between both fingerprints. The matching algorithm is unknown, but as the template format and the matching score are accessible, a hill-climbing attack may be performed. 4. Experiments
Database
The attack algorithms presented above have been tested on a sub-corpus from the MCYT database [11] . The fingerprint images are acquired with a 500 dpi optical sensor, model UareU by Digital Persona (see Fig. 3 ). We consider 10 samples from the right and left index fingers of 75 users, with 6 samples acquired with a high level of control [11] (i.e. small rotation or displacement from the center of the sensor), 2 with medium control level, and the last 2 samples with low control level. Therefore there are 75 x 2 x 10 = 1500 samples.
We compute the two-dimensional histogram ofthe minutia locations of all the fingerprints of the considered subcorpus. Fig. 4 depicts this histogram and a rectangle obtained heuristically that contains most minutiae. It can be seen that there are nearly no minutiae outside an elliptic region. Minutiae are nearly uniformly distributed in the rectangle with a higher concentration at its center. This rectangle will be used in our hill-climbing attacks as explained in Sect. 4. The verification performance of both systems is also studied. We use one of the low control samples as a template and the other 9 samples from the same finger as probes to test genuine matches, leading to 150 x 9 = 1350 genuine user scores. Impostor scores are obtained comparing each template to one sample from each other finger of the subcorpus, thus we have 150 x 149 = 22350 impostor scores. 
Experimental Protocol
Our experiments are based on the ones presented in [8] . A number of 100 initial synthetic random templates are generated and sent to the matcher to attack a specific user account. Synthetic templates are generated with a fixed number of minutiae which is the mean number of minutiae in the fingerprints from the database (25 in [8] If the matching score increases in any of these iterations, the modified template is saved, otherwise it is not.
In our experiments, we study the effects of different attack parameters by observing which iterations achieve, on average, more matching score increases during the attacks. We also study the influence of the initial number of minutiae and how these can be generated to Table 2 . Hill-climbing results on the Match-on-Card system mance of our attacks. A first attack will be performed using the mean number of minutiae in our database and the four types of iterations. In each attack, the 150 user templates are attacked using the same method (same initial minutiae generating scheme, same type of iterations and decision point) and statistics are gathered about the success rate of the attack. According to the results, the attacks are modified in order to better understand the factors involved in the success rate.
The synthetically generated templates will first have a random uniform minutiae distribution of 38 minutiae, which is the mean number of minutiae in our database.
For the NFIS2 system, we choose a decision threshold of 35 for the match score, leading to a 0.10% FAR and a 3.33% FRR. This means that a brute-force attack would theoretically need an average of 1000 iterations. For the Match-onCard system a decision threshold of 55 is selected, resulting in a FAR of approximately 0.16% and a FRR of 17.33%. Thus, for the MoC system, 640 iterations would be needed by a brute-force attack.
We define the success-rate of an attack as the proportion of fingerprints for which the decision threshold is reached using less iterations than a brute-force attack. We establish a maximum of 5000 and 2000 iterations for the NFIS2 and the MoC system respectively.
Experimental Results
We first attack the NFIS2 system using the method described in [8] . As it has been said in Sect. 4.1, there is a region where it is most probable to find minutiae. From now on, we will refer to this region as the Region Of Interest (ROI). We subsequently run the algorithm considering only minutiae in the inside of the ROI, i.e. without generating, adding or displacing any minutia outside the ROI. Fig. 6 shows the score progression and the minutiae maps of a successful hill-climbing attack on NFIS2 while Fig. 7 shows the same data for an unsuccessful attack.
For the Match-On-Card system, we start with the best configuration obtained by the NFIS2 system. We first study the influence of the initial number of minutiae, see Table 2.(a). As it can be seen, 25 initial minutia achieve better results (success rate of 123/150) than the mean number of minutiae (success rate of 78/150). This may be an effect of the limited capacity of the MoC matching algorithm.
In the next experiment, we study the influence of each iteration. Table 2 .b shows the results obtained. Again, as on the NFIS2 system, iterations b and c are the most effective ones. The poor performance of iteration a points out that the MoC system is not very sensitive to small minutiae displacements or rotations. The attack score progression and the minutiae maps of a successful attack are depicted Fig. 8 . The same data same data for an unsuccessful attack is shown in Fig. 9 .
Finally we study the relevance of using the ROI under this configuration. In Table 2 .(c) we see the decrease in performance without using the ROI (from 123/150 to 91/150 success rate).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have performed and studied hillclimbing attacks on the NFIS2 reference system and a Match-on-Card embedded system. NFIS2 is a PC-based fingerprint recognition system while the MoC system is a hardware limited system.
As it has been shown, the performance of hill-climbing attacks is heavily dependent upon the system under attack and the iterations that are performed. Attacks with a reduced number of minutiae are highly successful against the MoC system, while their performance against NFIS2 is very poor.
NFIS2 has proven to be more robust against hillclimbing attacks, at least with a reduced number of iterations. On the other hand, if we allow for a higher number of iterations (such as 5000 in our experiments), most accounts can be broken. It may be derived from the results that hill-climbing attacks are less effective than brute-force attacks, at least in the case of NFIS2. This statement must be taken with care, as hill-climbing attacks require much less resources than the ones needed by a brute-force attack.
In fact, to perform an efficient brute force attack, the attacker must have a database of more than a thousand of real fingerprint templates, whereas there is no need for real templates in the case of a hill-climbing attack. 
